This month was marked by a flurry of government measures aimed to: (i) ensure the reduction in tariffs promised to consumers and, simultaneously, avoid bankruptcy of distribution utilities, by shifting to the National Treasury the costs of ESS; and (ii) reduce the Treasury's expenses of the same ESS through two actions: (a) transferring part of ESS to generators and traders; and (b) increasing the short-term prices through changes in the operational model. This section discusses the (apparent lack of) technical justification of measure (a); in the next issue we will deal with measure (b).
In this section, we again analyze the asymmetry of the seasonalization rules for MRE hydro power plants, which led to a standstill in the short-term market.
The Juridical section gives an analysis of the complex consequences — from the tributary point of view — of one on the new rules introduced in the ACL by Law 12783 of January 2013: the possibility of contracts' cession by free and special consumers at freely negotiated prices.
In this section, we return to the Indian question, in light of recent violence in the conflict between Indian peoples and occupation fronts for agricultural, timber and mineral exploitation.
Besides the traditional analyses of supply and hydrology, we present here the new quinquennial risk-aversion curve (CAR5) recently established by ONS.